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Integrity of the Bottle
By HENRY V. PENNINGTON*
One of the most interesting rules in the law of torts in Ken-
tucky is the rule encompassed in the phrase, "Integrity of the
Bottle" which first made its appearance in 1950 in the case of
East Kentucky, Beverage Co. v. Stumbo.1 The rule was an out-
growth of the adoption by the Kentucky court of a rule found
in a Tennessee case.' In the Stumbo case the plaintiff found a
contraceptive in his mouth after drinking part of the contents of
a popular soft-drink. The Court, through Judge Cammack,
stated:
3
We do not think the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (that of
presumptive or prima facie negligence) should be extende.
to cover a situation such as we have before us. As pointed
out by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the case of
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158
S.W. 2d. 721, 171 A.L.R. 1200, a higher degree of proof
should be required in the case of a bottled drink to show
that there has been no reasonable opportunity to tamper
with the bottle or its contents in the interim between the
physical control of the bottler and that of the consumer.
Thus, in cases involving foreign matter in soft-drinks the rule was
established placing a burden of proof on the consumer bordering
on the impossible in the majority of cases.
To enable the reader to view Kentucky's approach to the prob-
lem presented in these cases prior'to the Stumbo case, a chrono-
logical review of past decisions will be presented. The Kentucky
Court first faced the problem of foreign matter in soft-drink bot-
tles twenty-four years ago. In the case of Nehi Bottling Co. v.
Thomas,4 decided in 1930, the drinker of a "grape" complained
of its bad taste. Examination of the bottle disclosed something
wrapped in foil and shortly thereafter the drinker became vio-
* A.B., Centre College; LL.B., University of Kentucky. Member of Danville,
Kentucky Bar.'313 Ky. 66, 230 S.W. 2d. 106 (1950).
'Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W. 2d. 721,
171 A.L.R. 1200 (1942).
230 S.W. 2d. at 107.
236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W. 2d. 701 (1930).
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lently ill. Analysis of the contents of the bottle and the drinker's
stomach disclosed that arsenic trioxide in quantity was present in
the bottle. The judgment for the drinker of the "pop" was re-
versed on appeal because the evidence failed to show that ap-
pellant had in fact bottled the drink. The Court went on to state,
however,5 quoting Quillen v. Skaggs,6 that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applied in the case:
'Where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management of defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordi-
nary course of things does not happen if those who have
its management or control use proper care, it affords reason-
able evidence in the absence of explanation of the defend-
ant,7 that the accident arose from want of care .... The
reason or theory of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based
in part upon the consideration that, as the management and
control of the agency which produced the injury is, under
the circumstances to which the doctrine applies, exclusively
vested in the defendant, plaintiff is not in a position to show
the particular circumstances which caused the offending in-
strumentality to operate to his injury, while defendant, be-
ing more favorably situated, possessed the superior knowl-
edge or means of information as to the course of the ac-
cident, and should, therefore, be required to produce the
evidence in explanation.'
The Court explains" that Kentucky has chosen the tort theory to
apply to these "pop" cases in contrast with the constructive war-
ranty-contract theory employed in some jurisdictions. The rea-
soning is based on the old theory that the purchaser did not pur-
chase direct from the manufacturer and hence no contract existed
between them. Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
never expressly adopted the rule evolved from the famous Mc-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.0 case it has long been conceded that
the manufacturer of bottle drinks is liable for negligence either be-
cause the manufactured item was "iminently" or- "inherently"
dangerous'0 or because the manufacture involved food.1'
I id., 33 S.W. 2d. at 702.8238 Ky. 171, 25 S.W. 2d. 33, 34 (1930).
7Italics throughout the article are the writer's.
'Supra note 4, 33 S.W. 2d. at 703.
0217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), noted 42 Ky. LJ. 273 (1954).
" Supra, note 9.
u PnossEx, TORTS at 676.
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It would appear important at this point to note the contrast
the Kentucky law presents in applying the "exclusive control"
theory in the "bottle" cases with the application of the theory in
a case involving a runaway automobile.'2 Clearly, there are three
essential elements required before a case can be brought into the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. They are: 1) the instrumentality must
be under the control and management of the defendant; 2) the
circumstances, according to common knowledge and experience,
must create a clear inference that the accident would not have
happened if the defendant had not been negligent; and 8) the
plaintiff's injury must have resulted from the accident. 13 In the
automobile case, the defendant had parked on a hill, turned his
wheels into a curb, applied his emergency brake and the car had
remained in such a position for over thirty minutes before the
accident, occasioned by the automobile rolling down a hill and
striking the plaintiff. Was the instrumentality under the control
and management of the defendant? Definitely not, but the Court
held that the case was one within the class in which the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur could be applied. This decision was reached
in 1950 and in the same year the Court required a higher degree
of proof to show that there was no reasonable opportunity to
tamper with a bottle or its contents after it left the physical con-
trol of the bottlerl
In the 1982 case of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shelbyville v.
Creech," the plaintiff was allowed to recover when a decomposed
mouse was found in a soft-drink after plaintiff had drunk all of
the contents. In the statement of facts the Court noted that the
evidence of the bottler disclosed the most scrupulous care in bot-
tling its products, so that it would seem impossible for a mouse to
get into the bottle. The plaintiff traced the bottle from the time
it left the bottler's hands until it came to her, and then she pointed
to the mouse. Is this the forerunner of our present-day rule re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove that no one could have tampered
with the bottle from the time it left the bottler until opened by
the consumer? The writer submits that this case might, in fact,
be the forerunner but further submits that the case was really no
'Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536, 228 S.W. 2d. 432 (1950), and note Res Ipsa
Loquitur as Applied to a Runaway Car, 39 Ky. L.J. 328 (1951).
228 S.W. 2d. 432 at 433-434.
"245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W. 2d. 745 (1932).
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more than a following of the Thomas' 5 case. A search of the case,
however, leaves the correct answer entirely to the reader's specu-
lation as the case is decided chiefly on instructions as to the
extent of the injury incurred.
A further interesting note in the Creech case is the fact that
the Court held that it was not error to exclude evidence of ap-
pellant to the effect that it was a common occurrence for soft-
drink bottles to be filled with substitutes and the caps taken off
and replaced by hand. The interest surrounding the holding rests
on the fact that the Court now takes judicial notice of this type
evidence concerning tampering with bottles.
Particles of glass were found in a bottle in the case of Nehi
Beverage Co. v. Hall.6 The Court merely restated its former posi-
tion that the consumer may directly sue the bottler even though
there was no contractual relation between them. A $1,000 verdict
was awarded the plaintiff for perforated intestines.
In the case of Seale v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Lexington,
Ky.17 we have the first concrete appearance of the term "integrity
of the bottle". The trial court recognized the rule of the Hall'
case which in turn had recognized the Thomas rule. 9 The trial
court set aside a verdict for $5,000 because plaintiff had failed to
establish the "integrity of the bottle" from the time it left ap-
pellee's plant until it was delivered to the consumer. The Court
of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, saying:
.. we are of the opinion that his (an absent witness) testi-
mony would not have been necessary to establish the in-
tegrity of the bottle, since the proof in respect to the sizzling
and hissing of the contents of the bottle, and the conditions
of the container itself, was sufficient for a jury to conclude
it had not been tampered with. .... 20
The Court of Appeals then continued with what the writer
submits is a sound and logical statement, namely:
There are times when the law must be content with the
proof of reasonable probabilities, and not exact the require-
ment that evidence in support of a cause be of such char-
'Supra, note 4.
" 295 Ky. 353, 174 S.W. 2d. 509 (1943).
' 297 Ky. 450, 179 S.W. 2d. 598 (1944).
'8 Supra, note 17.
Supra, note 4.
179 S.W. 2d. at 599.
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acter as to preclude the possibility of finding to the contrary.
(Citing Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., etc.,
224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56, 7 A.L.R. 1129). If a plaintiff in-
troduces the best evidence of which the case is susceptible
at the time of the trial, and it is reasonable to infer the
ultimate fact to be proven from the evidence introduced,
such showing, in the exigency of the situation, will be suf-
ficient to sustain a finding that the ultimate fact has been
established... 2 1
This, the writer submits, is a far better solution of the problem in
the soft-drink bottle cases than is the present rule.2
The year 1946 found the Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Lexing-
ton, Kentucky involved in another soft-drink bottle case.2 3 The in-
tegrity of the bottle was satisfactorily proved when plaintiff
showed that the retailer bought the bottle from the bottling com-
pany in the normal course of trade and that none of the bottles
had been opened before the sale took place. The $250 verdict
awarded to plaintiff for finding a bee in her drink was set aside as
excessive in view of the fact that there was no loss of time from
work, no physician was consulted and plaintiff incurred no other
expense.24
In 1950, in Glasgow v. Reed, the Court upheld a $300 verdict
awarded plaintiff for drinking from a soft-drink bottle containing
a decomposed mouse.
25
Returning now to the 1950 Stumbo case20 in which the Court
of Appeals first abolished the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in these bottle cases and installed the "integrity of
the bottle" rule, we find that the Court noted that sugar rationing
had been discontinued in the summer of 1947 but that there was
still stiff competition between bottlers, all of whom had acess to
the storeroom where the guilty bottle was stored in the retailer's
" Id., at 600.
'The case of Seale was not to rest, and in 1945 (Coca-Cola Bottling Works
of Lexington, Ky., v. Seale, 299 Ky. 409, 185 S.W. 2d. 685, 1945) the case was
back in the Court of Appeals on an appeal to set aside the verdict, now reduced
to $2,000, gained on the second trial below. The appeal was chiefly concerned
with procedural matters concerning absent witnesses and the Court again held the
bottler wasn't entitled to a directed verdict.
"Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Curtis, 302 Ky. 199, 194 S.W. 2d. 375 (1946).
'In a humorous opinion, Judge Siler extolled the virtues of the honey bee
and stated that the case was mostly "a case of a bee being where it should not
be...."
- Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Reed, 312 Ky. 731, 229 S.W. 2d. 488
(1950).
1Supra, note 1.
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place of business. The Court further noted that the drink was not
opened in the store but was carried home by the victim's daugh-
ter and that no doctor was called nor was plaintiff later treated by
one for his suffering. Because of the particular circumstances
surrounding the case the Court held that the "integrity of the
bottle" was of prime importance in the situation presented. judge
Cammack, in his opinion, distinguished it from the Seale case be-
cause of the unusual opportunity to tamper with the bottle and
from the Reed case on the grounds that the latter case presented
a situation where bottles were vended by a machine tended by
the bottler's employees.
The Court followed a Tennessee case,27 which has been criti-
cised even in Tennessee 28 requiring a higher degree of care on
the part of the defendant to show that there has been no oppor-
tunity to tamper with bottles or their contents between the phy-
sical control of the bottler and that of the consumer. The Ten-
nessee court" stated that it must be made to appear, by a clear
preponderance of evidence, that there has been no such divided
or intervening control of the bottle as to afford any reasonable
opportunity for it or its contents to have been tampered with. As
stated, when the court talked about "high degree of care" they
were talking about the duty of the defendant. The case turned
on the fact that the evidence abundantly "shows reasonable op-
portunity, by accident or design, for substitutes or for tamper-
ing .. ,3o Yet, strangely enough, our Court has used the case to
establish the Kentucky rule.
1953 found two additional soft-drink bottle cases appearing.
The first s' merely refers to the second, Ashland Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Byrne, 2 decided the same day. In the latter case we
again find a dead mouse (it was a spider in the other case decided
that day) in the bottle. The Court strains hard in the Ashland
case to find a set of facts comparable to those in the Stumbo case.
The writer submits that the case is not nearly so strong where it is
further submitted that the Court was justified in finding what it
' Supra, note 2.
2122 TENN. L.R. 985, at 1000-1004, in which the Tennessee rule is traced.
Supra note 2, 158 S.W. at 725.
Supra, note 29, at 1209.
m Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 258 S.W. 2d. 474
(1953).
'258 S.W. 2d. 475 (1953).
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did from those facts. In the Ashland case it would appear that be-
cause the clerk was not required to stand guard over the bottles
that the bottler was freed of liability.
The drink was purchased in a small grocery and opened and
drunk on the premises in the presence of the clerk. In the Stumbo
case the bottle was taken home by the drinker's daughter and
opened there. The bottle in the Ashland case was in a lift-top
cooler in the back of the main storeroom and the drinker had
selected the bottle himself by going to the cooler and removing it.
The facts of the Stumbo case do not tell us whether or not a clerk
selected the bottle for the drinker's daughter but it is apparent
that he himself did not select it. The retailer in the Ashland case
replenished his supply of drinks weekly and the evidence in the
Stumbo case showed that the retailer did not know when he pur-
chased the offensive pop. In the Ashland case the soft drinks
were stored in a corner of the main storeroom; in the Stumbo
case they were stored in a storeroom which adjoined the store
proper. Yet, the Court said, "The facts in this [Ashland] case,
concerning integrity of the bottle, cannot be distinguished from
those in East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo."33 It is submitted
that the Stumbo case is a full departure from the logic displayed
in the Seale case3 4 and is evidence of judicial fiat in an attempt
to draw an analogy to a case wherein numerous possibilities for
tampering with the bottles existed. The Court, more or less in
retrospect, states:
Human experience has forced us to the conclusion that the
presence of foreign objects in bottled drinks may in the
ordinary course of things be the result of a prank or a
deliberate wrongful act equally as well as being the result
of negligence on the part of the bottler. . ...35
Thus, the Court imparts integrity to a bottle enjoyed by no other
inanimate object, and few animate ones, and clothes the bottlers
of soft-drinks with protection enjoyed by no other manufacturer
of any product. It is creditable, the writer submits, that Justices
Duncan and Milliken, in dissent, state that they do not subscribe
to the theory that the placing of foreign objects in bottles by
pranksters or evildoers is a matter of such common occurrence as
Supra note 17.
Supra, note 17.
258 S.W. 2d. at 476.
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to justify the conclusion that the possibility of that happening
must be disproved before the presumption of negligence of the
bottler may be applied. These members of the Court follow the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, "without qualification" and note that
such distinguished jurisdictions as Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri,
Texas and Virginia do likewise."
The latest soft-drink bottle case in Kentucky was Glasgow
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Wilson. 7 In the Wilson case another
dead mouse had invaded another bottle, just as in the Reed38 case.
The Court again denied the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur as in the Stumbo case.39 Here, or so it would appear,
rests the Kentucky rule in these cases.
It is again submitted that our Court in establishing the present
rule has placed a burden on the plaintiffs in these cases bordering
on the impossible. What plaintiff could establish the "integrity
of the bottle" from the time it left the bottling works until opened
by him in some business house dispensing soft-drinks? If the
situation visualized by the Court in which pranksters and worse
run rampant over our state injecting contraceptives, mice, spiders
and other equally repugnant foreign matter in our "pop" really
exists, then the only safe way to guarantee recovery after drink-
ing a soft-drink diluted with strange contents is to get it directly
from the conveyor belt in the bottling works. Then, and only
then, can the drinker be assured that the "integrity of the bottle"
has been put into disrepute when he gulps a drink of something
more than he bargained for.
Attorneys Wilson, Wilson and Clark in the brief prepared in
the Wilson case comment on the fact that bottlers of soft-drinks
have done an excellent job in preventing occurrences such as have
Supra, note 85.
242 S.W. 2d. 872 (1954). It is interesting that the same attorneys in this
case represented the same sides (that is, plaintiff and defendant, respectively) as
in the Reed case. The same defendant was even present but Wilson and Wilson,
Glasgow, represented a different plaintiff. Another dead mouse was present, but
the plaintiff lost.
' Supra, note 25.
The Court commended Attorneys Wilson, Wilson and Beverly Clark for an
able brief and those who have read it will readily agree. Not only is brilliant
argument presented but also humor hard to surpass. To give but a touch of the
humor, the appellee stated:
"He (the writer) does not believe that the title of the old Irish ditty, 'Who
Threw the Overalls in Mrs. Murphy's Chowder?' has been changed into the
American tragedy of 'Who Stuffed the Rodent in My Soda-Pop?"'
The writer of this article is most grateful to the brief writers for the oppor-
tunity to study it. It has been most helpful in preparing this work.
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made their appearance in these cases. They remind us, however,
that even in the most spick and span homes, exploying the latest
methods, we are often beset by pests. Then they compare the
home with a bottling works where sugar and syrups are the work-
ing tools of the trade. The brief writers have gone a long way in
exploding the "prankster" theory when they remind that the
prankster would probably be deprived of his hard-earned laugh
because his intended victim might choose one of several bottles
and miss the primed one altogether. 40 The overzealous "com-
petitor" theory is also deflated by the writers when they suggest
that every time a wheel comes off a Studebaker truck one might
immediately blame Dodge, International, Ford, Diamond T or
any number of other competitors. 4'
In summary, it is submitted that our Court has installed a rule
impossible to bear by a plaintiff. Surely no person could wish to
subject bottlers of soft-drinks to more liability than other manu-
facturers, but on the other hand few would wish to clothe these
people with any more protection than corresponding businesses.
Our people will soon lose sight of the justice interwoven into
their law when they are faced with a burden of proof requiring
them to ride "shotgun" over their soft-drinks from the bottler to
the lips. If tighten the law we must, let's leave enough room for
a case to be weighed.
:o A pellee's Brief, Glasgow Bottling Works v. Wilson, at 13-14.SId.,at 15.
